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1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant Two Jinn, Inc. ("Two Jinn") appeals from the district court's order denying 
Two Jiim's Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond ("Motion to Exonerate Bond"), 
based upon the district court's discretionary determination that justice required enforcement of 
the bond forfeiture. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts 
On December 1, 2008, Defendant Brett Robert Bardsley was charged with the felony of 
driving under the influence of alcohol, as well as the misdemeanors of driving without privileges 
and providing false information to a police officer. R. 7-8, 11, 15-17. Bond was set at $10,000, 
with the requirement that Mr. Bardsley wear a SCRAM device, an alcohol-monitoring device 
typically worn on the ankle.' R. 11. Two Jinn posted the $10,000 bond on December 2, 2008. 
R. 34, 38. 
At a preliminary hearing held on February 24, 2009, Mr. Bardsley requested that he be 
permitted to remove the SCRAM device; the district court denied his request. R. 18. Mr. 
Bardsley ceased paying for his SCRAM device on February 26, 2009 and failed to download the 
alcohol data from the device beginning March 9, 2009, in violation of the terms of his bond. 
R. 24-25, 65, 77. The Prosecutor filed a Motion to Revoke and Increase the Bond on March 23, 
' 
- See,m, http://www.al~~holmonitoring.cotn/ (last visited May 18, 2010). 
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2009, based upon Mr. Bardsley's failure to comply with the terms of his bail regarding his 
SCRAM device. R. 24-25, 77. 
The following day, on March 24,2009, Mr. Bardsley failed to appear in court. R. 26-27, 
39. At the hearing, Mr. Bardsley's attorney noted that Mr. Bardsley's residence was in 
California. R. 27. In fact, the December 2008 charge of driving without privileges stemmed 
from the suspension of his California driver's license. R. 6-8. 
The Court ordered Mr. Bardsley's bond forfeited on the date of his failure to appear: 
March 24, 2009. R. 39. Four months later, on July 20, 2009, Two Jinn discovered that Mr. 
Bardsley was in federal custody in San Diego County, California, due to mail fraud charges. 
R. 35. Mr. Bardsley had been taken into federal custody in Idaho on June 9, 2009. R. 79. 
Three weeks after its discovery of Mr. Bardsley's location, on August 12, 2009, Two Jinn 
notified the Ada County Prosecutor of Mr. Bardsley's federal incarceration in California. R. 36, 
4 1,44-49. 
In September 2009, San Diego County issued a complaint against Mr. Bardsley as a 
fbgitive from justice in Idaho. R. 66-67, 79, 81-82, 85. Mr. Bardsley refused to waive 
extradition to Idaho. R. 67, 78-79, 86. San Diego County notified Ada County of the complaint 
against Mr. Bardsley and his refusal to waive extradition via facsimile on September 16, 2009. 
R. 67, 79, 81-81. Ada County immediately began taking steps to initiate the extradition process. 
Id. 
-
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In the meantime, however, Two Jim, posted a $50,000 bond for Mr. Bardsley in 
California on September 3, 2009.~ R. 67, 78-79, 86. Thus, Mr. Bardsley was released from 
federal custody in California by a Two Jinn agent, but Two Jinn did not return Mr. Bardsley to 
Idaho at that time. 
On September 18, 2009, Two Jinn filed its Motion to Exonerate Bond, seeking 
exoneration of the bond forfeited by the district court on March 24, 2009. R. 28-29, 34-49. The 
180-day period following forfeiture of the bond expired on September 20, 2009. R. 35. Two 
J i m  finally surrendered Mr. Bardsley to the Ada County Jail on October 13, 2009, nearly one 
month after the expiration of the 180-day period. R. 50-52, 67, 79. Following briefing and oral 
argument on the issue, the district court denied Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate on December 
17,2009, and Two Jinn timely appealed to this Court. R. 89-97. 
11. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate 
Bond by determining that justice required enforcement of the bond forfeiture? 
111. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
The district court appropriately exercised its discretion in denying Two Jinn's Motion to 
Exonerate Bond. As discussed in detail below, the court acted within the boundaries of its 
Two Jinn conducts business as AIaddin Bail Bonds. See, ex.,  R. 86; www.twoiinn.com (last 
visited May 24, 2010). 
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discretion and consistently with the relevant legal standards. The mere fact that Mr. Bardsley 
was incarcerated for a portion of the 180-day period following forfeiture of the bond did not 
render the district court's denial of exoneration of the bond an abuse of discretion. The court 
carefully considered the issue and appropriately determined that exoneration was not warranted 
under the circumstances, a determination that was consistent with the applicable legal standards. 
Accordingly, the State of Idaho respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
denial of Two Jim's Motion to Exonerate Bond. 
B. Standard of Review 
"The decision whether to exonerate bond is committed to the trial court's discretion." 
State v. Two Jinn, Inc.1 ~ a r r i s ?  - P.3d -, 2010 WL 1338061, *I  (Idaho Ct. App. April 7, 
2010). A review of the district court's exercise of discretion involves consideration of whether 
the district court "correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and whether it 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 56, 44 P.3d 1108, 
Because more than one case entitled State v. Two Jinn. Inc. is cited within this memorandum, 
the individual criminal defendants' names are included in the citations for ease of reference. 
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C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Two Jinn's Motion to 
Exonerate Bond by Determining that Justice Required Enforcement of the Bond 
Forfeiture 
At the time of Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate Bond in this matter, Idaho Criminal Rule 
46(e)(414 provided that the trial court could set aside the forfeiture and exonerate the bond "if it 
appears that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture." "It is the surety's burden 
to establish grounds for relief from the forfeiture." State v. Two Jinn, Inc.1 Navarro, - P.3d -, 
2010 WL 1980405 (Idaho Ct. App. May 19, 2010). The decision whether to set aside a 
forfeiture or exonerate a bond pursuant to former Rule 46(e)(4) was within the trial court's 
discretion. Two Jinn. Inc.1 Harris, - P.3d -, 2010 WL 1338061 at *l; State v. RUDD, 123 
Idaho l ,  3, 843 P.2d 151, 153 (1992); State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50,54,910 P.2d 164, 168 (Ct. App. 
1994). As this Court has articulated: "In Idaho, it has long been held that the 'fixing of bail and 
release from custody are traditionally within the discretion of the courts. We believe that these 
matters are most wisely left to the trial judge."' &y, 128 Idaho at 53, 910 P.2d at 167 (quoting 
State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539,541,700 P.2d 942,944 (1985)). 
As noted above, a review by this Court of the district court's exercise of discretion 
involves consideration of whether the court: "(1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
acted within the outer boundaries of this discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d 11 14, 1126 (2009). 
A new version of Rule 46 became effective July 1, 2009. However, the prior version of Rule 
46 applies to the case at hand, as the forfeiture of the bond took place on March 24,2009. R. 39, 
91-92. 
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In the case at hand, the district court appropriately exercised its discretion in reaching its 
decision to deny Two Jim's Motion to Exonerate Bond. Two Jinn does not contest that the 
district court conectly perceived the issue as one of discretion. Appellant's Brief, p. 4. Indeed, 
the district court stated in its Memorandum Decision and Order: "The consideration of forfeiture 
and exoneration is a matter for the Court's discretion." R. 93. 
Two Jinn argues, however, that the district court "failed to act within the outer boundaries 
of its discretion, did not consistently apply the relevant legal standards, and did not reach its 
decision by an exercise of reason." Appellant's Brief, p. 8. To the contrary, the district court 
acted well within the outer bounds of its discretion and appropriately applied the applicable legal 
standards in reaching its discretionary decision, by an exercise of reason, that exoneration of the 
bond was not warranted, as discussed below, 
1. The District Court Appropriately Considered the &y Factors 
This Court articulated, in State v. Fry, various factors that should be considered by the 
district court under these circumstances: 
In deciding how much, if any, of the bond to forfeit, the court should also 
consider: (1) the willfulness of the defendant's violation of bail conditions; (2) the 
surety's participation in locating and apprehending the defendant; (3) the costs, 
inconvenience, and prejudice suffered by the state as a result of the violation; (4) 
any intangible costs; (5) the public's interest in ensuring a defendant's appearance; 
and (6) any mitigating factors. 
&, 128 Idaho at 54, 910 P.2d at 168 (emphasis added). 1-Iowever, "the & factors are not all- 
inclusive," as "[a] trial court may give weight to other relevant factors." State v. Ouick Release 
Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651, 655, 167 P.2d 788, 792 (Ct. App. 2007); see also Two Jim, Inc.1 
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Harris P.3d -, 2010 WL 1338061 at *2 ("A court may also consider any other relevant 
-> - 
factors . . ..") 
The district court appropriately considered and weighed the various & factors in 
reaching its decision. R. 93-95. The court's careful consideration of these factors supports the 
conclusion that the court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason. See Shore, 146 Idaho at 915,204 P.3d at 1126. 
First, the court considered the willfulness of Defendant Bardsley's failure to appear in 
court on March 24,2009, holding: 
It is apparent the defendant willfully avoided his scheduled Court date. He Failed 
to upload information from hi[s] SCRAM device, after removing the device. The 
defendant showed he had no intent on appearing in Ada County in March 2009. 
R. 93. Two Jiim acknowledges that "[tlhere is no evidence to dispute this finding." Appellant's 
Brief., p. 5. Indeed, the district court's conclusion was reasonable and well-supporied in the 
record. Mr. Bardsley asked the court for permission to remove his SCRAM device in February 
2009, which the court denied; almost immediately stopped paying for the SCRAM device and 
ceased uploading the alcohol data from the device in violation of the terms of his bail; never 
provided an excuse for his March 24, 2009 failure to appear; and later refused to waive 
extradition from California to appear before the court in Idaho. R. 18, 24-27, 39, 65, 67, 77-79, 
86. These facts led to the district court's reasonable conclusion that Mr. Bardsley's failure to 
appear was willful. R. 93. 
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The district court additionally considered the factor of "the surety's participation in 
locating and apprehending the defendant." &, 128 Idaho at 54,910 P.2d at 168; R. 93-94. The 
court held: 
The record shows Two Jinn mailed a letter to ihe defendant mailed on August 11 
and filed a notice of defendant's location on August 12, 2009. Two Jinn did not 
find the defendant. Federal authorities located the defendant almost five months 
earlier. When Two Jinn found the defendant, he was already in custody. Two 
Jinn made an attempt to get the defendant to appear in Idaho with its letter. 
However, Two Jinn granted the defendant an additional bond in California. There 
was no effort to assist the State with getting the defendant back to Idaho. 
R. 93-94. 
Two Jinn points to the facts that it notified the State of Mr. Bardsley's location (in federal 
custody in California) on August 12, 2009, and that it arrested and surrendered Mr. Bardsley to 
the Ada County Jail on October 13, 2009, nearly one month after the expiration of the 180-day 
period following forfeiture of the bond. Appellant's Brief, p. 6. These facts are correct. 
However, the district court was well within the boundaries of its discretion when it also 
considered the broader context of the above notification and apprehension. R. 93-94. 
Significantly, Two Jinn did not locate Mr. Bardsley until July 20, 2009, nearly four 
months after his failure to appear. R. 35. By that time, Mr. Bardsley had been incarcerated in 
California for more than a month. R. 79. Two J im argues that "the federal arrest impeded Two 
Jim's ability to arrest and surrender Bardsley within 180 days."' Appellant's Brief, p. 6. 
' Two Jinn cites to the case of State v. Two Jinn, Inc. / Dana, - Idaho -, 228 P.3d 1019 (Ct. 
App. 2010), in purported support of its assertion that "the federal arrest impeded Two Jim's 
ability to arrest and surrender Bardsley within 180 days." Appellant's Brief, p. 6. However, 
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However, in the two and a half month time period between Mr. Bardsley's March 24, 2009 
failure to appear in court and his June 9,2009 arrest on federal charges, Two Jinn failed to locate 
or apprehend Mr. Bardsley. R. 35, 79. Two Jinn also inexplicably waited three weeks after 
locating Mr. Bardsley to notify the State of his whereabouts and to send a letter to Mr. Bardsley 
in an attempt to encourage him to appear in Idaho. R. 35-36, 41, 44-49. Furthermore, a Two 
Jinn agent in California posted bail for Mr. Bardsley prior to the expiration of the 180-day 
period. R. 67, 78-79, 86. Mr. Bardsley was released from federal custody in California, courtesy 
of Two Jinn's posted bond, but Two Jinn failed to arrest Mr. Bardsley or otherwise ensure his 
return to Idaho at that time, even though it had the opportunity to do so. Id. As the district court 
aptly noted: 
Two Jinn was in the best position to assess the risk associated with the loss for the 
failed appearance in Ada County. It chose to grant the defendant another bond, 
rather than assure his return to Idaho within the 180 day window. 
R. 94. The district court was well within its discretion to consider these issues in the context of 
Two Jinn's participation in locating and apprehending the defendant. 
The district court additionally considered the Eji factors of "the costs, inconvenience, 
and prejudice suffered by the state as a result of the violation," and "any intangible costs." Eji, 
128 Idaho at 54,910 P.2d at 168. The court held: 
The State claims there were many costs associated with attempting to extradite the 
defendant back to Idaho. Since the defendant refused to waive extradition, there 
were expenses associated with both the state of Idaho and California in order to 
arrange the transport back to Idaho. The Court agrees with the State that Two 
Two Jinn, Inc.1 Dana does not stand for that proposition and does not even address an issue 
involving incarceration of a defendant. 
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J i m  could have used the second bond to assure the defendant's timely return to 
Idaho. If ihe defendant had appeared in Court when he was supposed to, none of 
these costs would have been incurred. 
With respect to the issue of costs, Two Jinn argues that the specific costs to the State 
were not made clear and that the State will receive a "windfall" because "[tlhe State did not incur 
costs to transport Bardsley." Appellant's Brief, p. 7. However, the district court's consideration 
of and conclusions regarding cost factors was well within the boundaries of its discretion. The 
record demonstrates that the State was obligated to initiate extradition proceedings after Two 
Jinn chose to post bond for Mr. Bardsley in California without ensuring his return to Idaho and 
after Mr. Bardsley refused to waive extradition. R. 67, 78-79, 81-81, 86. Although the State 
ultimately did not have to complete the extradition proceedings, time and resources were 
expended on initiating the process. In addition, the court's time and resources were wasted due 
to Mr. Bardsley's failure to appear in the first place. These costs would have been less had Two 
J i m  apprehended Mr. Bardsley in the two and a half months prior to his arrest or chosen to 
return Mr. Bardsley to Idaho when it later posted bond for him in California. 
In considering the & factor of "the public's interest in ensuring a defendant's 
appearance," the district court held: 
The public has a strong interest in making sure that defendants appear for their 
court dates. In this case, the criminal proceeding is delayed and is behind 
schedule. The purpose of the bond is to assure that people attend their hearings. 
The defendant clearly did not consider this important by failing to attend. 
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Two Jinn acknowledges that the "primary purpose of bail . . . is intended to ensure a 
defendant's presence in court," but argues that "[tlhe arrest and surrender of Bardsley once again 
brought Bardsley before the court." Appellant's Brief, p. 7 (citing to Quick Release Bail Bonds, 
144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792.) However, as the court appropriately considered, Mr. 
Bardsley willfully failed to appear for his March 2009 hearing, and the criminal proceedings 
against him were delayed by at least seven months. R. 94. As a Florida court articulated: "The 
purpose of a bail bond is to have the principal appear at a prescribed time. The fact that his 
presence may subsequently be obtained through extradition [or other means] cannot eliminate the 
prejudice to the state which must be presumed as a result of the delay in bringing him to trial. 
Since the surety failed to perfom its obligation, it must be held liable upon its undertaking." 
Pinellas Countv v. Robertson, 490 So.2d 1041, 1043 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986). 
Finally, the district court considered whether there were any mitigating factors, holding: 
From the record, there are no mitigating factors. In reality, the defendant was not 
returned to custody of Ada County until it booked him back into the jail on 
October 13, 2009. This is affer the 180 days from the time of his forfeiture. Two 
Jinn failed to find the defendant prior to his Federal arrest and failed to assure that 
he appeared for his court dates. This analysis must be assessed from the date the 
Defendant originally failed to appear to his Court date in March. Essentially, the 
defendant failed to appear before the Court. Neither Two Jinn, nor the defendant, 
provided sufficient reason why he failed to appear. The statute and Court rules 
say that the bond shall be forfeited. It is true, Federal Officers arrested the 
Defendant in June and placed the defendant in custody. However, the required 
appearance to the court date came in March. Federal custody did not affect his 
ability to appear in March of 2009. 
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Two Jinn points to its eventual arrest and surrender of Mr. Bardsley in October 2009 as a 
mitigating factor. Appellant's Brief, p. 7. As discussed by the district court, however, this 
occurred after the expiration of the 180-day period following forfeiture. Id. In addition, as the 
district court noted earlier in its decision, Two Jinn missed an earlier opportunity to return Mr. 
Bardsley to Idaho when it posted bond for Mr. Bardsley in California in September 2009. R. 67, 
78-79, 86. It was within the district court's discretion to consider that the belated return of Mr. 
Bardsley did not outweigh the unnecessary delay in prosecuting Mr. Bardsley, including Two 
Jinn's prior failure to return Mr. Bardsley to Idaho when presented with that opportunity. 
Two Jinn further argues that "Aladdin's [Two Jinn's] Idaho office had no notice of 
Bardsley's release from federal custody and the State's extradition proceedings." Appellant's 
Brief, p. 7. Two Jinn's apparent failure to establish effective lines of communication between its 
offices in different states does not constitute a "mitigating factor" in Two Jinn's favor. The fact 
remains that Two Jinn was the entity that posted bond for Mr. Bardsley in California. 
Two Jinn additionally suggests that Mr. Bardsley's incarceration in California was a 
mitigating factor. Id. As the district court noted, Mr. Bardsley failed to appear in March and 
was not arrested until June; thus, his incarceration in California did not prevent his court 
appearance, and Two Jinn had several months in which to locate and apprehend Mr. Bardsley 
prior to his federal arrest. R. 94-95. Furthermore, Two J i m  posted bond for Mr. Bardsley in 
September, prior to the expiration of the 180-day period following forfeiture, which provided 
Two Jinn with yet another opportunity to return Mr. Bardsley to the court within the required 
timeframe. R. 67, 78-79, 86. 
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Notably, this Court has previously held that incarceration of a defendant in another 
jurisdiction does not lead to automatic exoneration of the bond, but is instead one of many 
factors to be considered by the district court in reaching its discretionary decision. See Fry, 128 
Idaho at 53-54, 910 P.2d at 167-68. As this Court articulated in State v. Fry: 
Based upon our conclusion that questions of bond forfeiture are directed to the 
trial court's exercise of discretion, we believe that the discretion of the court 
considering forfeiture should not be limited by an absolute rule regarding 
incarceration in another jurisdiction. The incarceration, and its surrounding 
circumstances, should be factors with which the court makes the 
determination whether to forfeit the bail. 
w, 128 Idaho at 53-54,910 P.2d at 167-68 (emphasis added) 
Of particular note is the fact that the surety, Two Jim, contracted to assume the risk of 
the defendant leaving the jurisdiction and/or committing another crime that could lead to 
incarceration in another jurisdiction, particularly as Mr. Bardsley was apparently a California 
resident. R. 27. 
"Sureties know and solemnly contract that the defendant shall appear and abide 
the orders of the court and in the event of his default are bound by their 
obligation. . . . 
Other reasons for denying relief to the surety are these: . . . the removal of the 
principal to Oklahoma and his falling into the toils of the law of that state are the 
result of defendant's own voluntary act; the surety is at fault for permitting 
him to go into another jurisdiction, instead of keeping him under its control. 
State v. Hammond, 426 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Mo. 1968) (quoting State v. I-Iinoiosa, 271 S.W.2d 522, 
524 (Mo 1954)). In fact, the United States Supreme Court has long held that a surety should not 
be automatically relieved of its obligations simply because the defendant leaves the jurisdiction: 
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When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the custody of his 
sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the original imprisoixnent. Whenever 
they choose to do so, they may seize him and deliver him up in their discharge; 
and if that cannot be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be done. 
They may exercise their rights in person or by agent. They may pursue him into 
another State; may arrest hiin on the Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and 
enter his house for that purpose. The seizure is not made by virtue of new process. 
None is needed. It is likened to the rearrest by the sheriff of an escaping prisoner. 
In 6 Modern it is said: 'The bail have their principal on a string, and may pull the 
string whenever they please, and render him in their discharge.' . . . They may 
doubtless permit him to go beyond the limits of the State within which he is 
to answer, hut it is unwise and imprudent to do so; and if any evil ensue, they 
must bear the burden of the consequences, and cannot cast them upon the 
obligee. 
In the case of Devine v. The State, the court, speaking of the principal, say, 'The 
sureties had the control of his person; they were bound at their peril to keep 
him within their jurisdiction, and to have his person ready to surrender 
when demanded. . . . In the case before us, the failure of the sureties to surrender 
their principal, was, in the view of the law, the result of their own negligence or 
connivance, in suffering their principal to go beyond the jurisdiction of the court 
and from under their control.' 
Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1872) (emphasis added). 
A bail bond is a three-party contract between the state, the accused, and the 
surety, whereby the surety guarantees appearance of the accused. The risk of a 
defendant not appearing is borne by the surety and the surety, in order to protect 
its interest, must take precautionary actions to prevent this type of situation. . . . 
Surety's inability to perform its obligation is due to its own fault in permitting 
the defendant to leave the State. . .. 
Allegheny Cas. Co. v. State, 850 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added). 
The district court appropriately considered the fact of Mr. Bardsley's incarceration in 
California and reached the reasonable conclusion that the circumstances did not warrant 
exoneration of the bond. 
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In sum, Two Jinn does not argue the district court failed to consider the factors 
in reaching its discretionary decision. Instead, Two Jinn appears to suggest that the 
district court abused its discretion because it did not attribute the same weight to the factors as 
Two Jinn would have done. This was not an abuse of discretion. Deciding which weight to 
attribute to various factors under consideration is the very essence of discretion. See Black's 
Law Dictionary 499 (8Ih ed. 2004) (defining "discretion" as "[iJndividual judgment; the power of 
free decision-making," and '7udicial discretion" as "[tlhe exercise of judgment by a judge or 
court based on what is fair under the circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of 
law; a court's power to act or not act when a litigant is not entitled to demand the act as a matter 
of right") (emphasis added). "Where the trial court has exercised its discretion after a careful 
consideration of the relevant factual circumstances and principles of law, and without arbitrary 
disregard for those facts and principles of justice, that exercise of discretion has not been abused 
and will not be disturbed." Decker v. Homeguard Svs., a Div. of Intermountain Gas Co., 105 
Idaho 158, 161, 163, 666 P.2d 11 69, 11 72, 11 74 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the court having 
given more weight to certain factors under its consideration than others did not constitute an 
abuse of discretion); see also In re Doe, 147 Idaho 243, 255-56, 207 P.3d 974, 986-87 (2009) 
(holding that the court did not abuse its discretion when it considered and weighed all relevant 
factors and determined that five of the six factors supported its decision). 
Simply because Two Jinn does not appear to agree with the weight accorded the various 
factors by the district court does not transform the court's decision into an abuse of 
discretion. The district court carefully considered and weighed the & factors, applied them to 
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the facts of the case, and reached the discretionary determination that the circumstances of this 
case did not warrant exoneration of the bond. The court's careful consideration of the &y 
factors was within the boundaries of its discretion and demonstrated a clear exercise of reason. 
2. The District Court Acted Consistently with the Applicable Legal Standards 
Two Jinn has additionally argued that the district court "did not consistently apply the 
relevant legal standards." Appellant's Brief, p. 8. It is not particularly clear from Two Jinn's 
brief which legal standards Two Jinn claims were misapplied by the court. The court 
appropriately analyzed whether justice required forfeiture of the bond, pursuant to former Idaho 
Criminal Rule 46(e)(4); applied and considered the factors; and reached its discretionary 
decision. Two Jinn does not explain how the court's actions were counter to the applicable legal 
standards. 
Two Jinn raises the argument that former Idaho Code 5 19-2925 and Idaho Code 5 19- 
2914, which allowed for the arrest of the defendant by the surety at any time before exoneration 
of bail, would be rendered null after 180 days past forfeiture. Appellant's Brief, pp. 6-7. Two 
Jinn asserts that this is an absurd result and that "[tlherefore, the trial court did not reach its 
decision by an exercise of reason." Appellant's Brief, pp. 6-7. First, these provisions were not 
rendered null after 180 days, as Two Jinn asserts. A surety could still choose to arrest a 
defendant after the 180-day period following forfeiture, pursuant to Idaho Code 5 19-2914. A 
surety would not be entitled to automatic exoneration for having done so under former Idaho 
Code 5 19-2927, but this would not nullify the legal effect of Section 19-2914, which is to allow 
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arrest of the defendant by the surety. It is difficult to ascertain how this is an "absurd" result that 
would render the district court's decision an abuse of discretion. 
Neither was it a misapplication of the applicable legal standards; instead, the court 
appropriately recognized that the law did not provide for automatic exoneration where the 
defendant was not returned to court by the surety within the 180-day period. R. 92-93. In fact, 
Two Jinn appears to be arguing that the court abused its discretion by applying the correct legal 
standard to the circumstances, rather than allowing for automatic exoneration where it did not 
apply. See R. 92-95; E.C. 5 19-2927 (2008). 
Similarly, Two Jim argues: 
The district court's conclusion that Two Jinn failed to find Bardsley before his 
federal arrest shortens the 180 day time period in which to locate a defendant, 
which is an absurd result. Constructions of a statute that lead to an absurd result 
are disfavored. 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-8. As discussed in detail above, it was not "an absurd result" for the 
district court to reach its discretionary decision to deny exoneration, despite Mr. Bardsley's 
incarceration during a portion of the 180-day time period. To the contrary, reaching this 
determination involved correct application of Idaho case law, which has held that incarceration 
of the defendant in another jurisdiction does not entitle the surety to automatic exoneration, but is 
instead merely another factor to be considered by the court. &y, 128 Idaho at 53-54,910 P.2d at 
167-68. It is not "absurd" for a court to find that a surety has contracted to assume the risk that a 
defendant may commit another crime and become incarcerated, nor is it "absurd" for the court to 
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expect a surety to act quickly and diligently to locate and apprehend a defendant following the 
defendant's failure to appear. 
This Court recently held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that 
justice required enforcement of a bond forfeiture even where the defendant was allegedly 
deported from the country approximately two weeks after forfeiture of the bond. In State v. Two 
Jim, 1nc.l Navarro, this Court held: 
Most significantly, the evidence did not show that Two Jinn acted timely and 
diligently to ensure Navarro's presence in court. The evidence that was 
presented shows that Two Jinn did not take expeditious action after the 
notice of forfeiture issued on August 15, 2007. Rather, after being assigned to 
the case on August 20, 2007, Gann's first reported act on the case was a telephone 
call made on August 29, two weeks after the forfeiture and the day after Navarro 
allegedly was deported. At that time it was already too late for the State to make 
any effort to regain custody of Navarro and complete this prosecution before his 
deportation. Further, the record contains no indication that once Two Jinn 
received hearsay reports that Navarro had been taken into federal custody, it 
promptly so informed the prosecutor or the court. 
Two Jinn would have us hold that proof that a defendant was deported ipso 
facto satisfies the former Rule 46(e)(4) criterion that "justice does not require 
the enforcement of the forfeiture." We decline to do so. In our view, it is 
appropriate for the court to take into account the diligence and efforts of the 
surety to locate the defendant and notify the court or  prosecutor of 
deportation proceedings, as well as any conduct of the State that may have 
caused the deportation, and any other pertinent factors. In short, factors of the 
type described in Quick Release are to be weighed in the event of a deportation 
just as they are in other cases. Applying those factors in the present case, Two 
Jinn has not shown that the magistrate abused his discretion in denying relief from 
the bond forfeiture. 
- P.3d -, 20 10 WL 1980405 (emphasis added). 
Notably, this Court considered a delay of only two weeks after forfeiture to be untimely 
in the Two Jinn, Inc.1 Navarro case quoted above; in the case at hand, Two Jinn did not locate 
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Mr. Bardsley until nearly four months after his failure to appear, by which point he was already 
incarcerated. R. 35. As in Two Jinn, Jnc./ Navmo, it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
district court to determine that justice required enforcement of the bond forfeiture, even where 
the defendant was incarcerated at the time Two Jinn beIatedly located him. This is particularly 
so given that Two Jinn still had a later opportunity to return Mr. Bardsley to Idaho within the 
180-day period, after Two Jinn posted bond for Mr. Bardsley in California, but failed to do so. 
In short, the district court appropriately exercised its discretion in accordance with the 
applicable legal standards in reaching its decision to deny the Motion to Exonerate. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate 
Bond. The court recognized the issue as one of discretion, acted well within the boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards, and reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. See Shore, 146 Idaho at 915, 204 P.3d at 1126. Accordingly, the State 
respectfully requests that this Court uphold the district court's denial of Two Jinn's Motion to 
Exonerate Bond. 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of May, 2010. 
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